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Abstract
Observer memories, memories where one sees oneself in the remembered scene, 
from-the-outside, are commonly considered less accurate and genuine than visual 
field memories, memories in which the scene remembered is seen as one originally 
experienced it. In Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll 
debunks this commonsense conception by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of 
observer memories.  On the one hand, he explains how observer and field perspectives 
are not really mutually exclusive in an experience, including memory experiences.  On 
the other hand, he argues that in observer memories there is no additional explicit 
representation of oneself experiencing the event: the self-presence is transparent and 
given by the mode of presentation.  Whereas these are two lines of strategic and 
original argumentation, they are not exempt of problems.  In this critical notice, I 
focus on the problematic aspects of McCarroll’s account.  I show that it presents some 
issues that affect the internal coherence of the overall framework, and that some 
aspects and central notions would have needed more development to offer a precise 
picture of the nature of observer memories.
Key words: Episodic Memory; Observer Memory; Visual Perspective; Mental 
Imagery; Theories of Memory; Self-Presence.
Resumen 
Los recuerdos de observador, recuerdos en los que uno se ve a sí mismo en la escena 
recordada, desde el exterior, se consideran comúnmente menos precisos y genuinos que 
los recuerdos de campo, que aluden a los recuerdos en los que la escena rememorada 
se ve como uno la experimentó originalmente. En Remembering from the Outside 
(OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll desmitifica esta concepción de sentido común al 
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ofrecer un análisis detallado de la naturaleza de los recuerdos de los observadores. 
Por un lado, el autor explica cómo las perspectivas de observador y de campo no son 
en realidad mutuamente excluyentes en una experiencia, incluso en las experiencias 
de recuerdo. Por otro lado, argumenta que en los recuerdos de observador no hay 
una representación explícita adicional de uno mismo experimentando el evento: la 
presencia de uno mismo es transparente y está dada por el modo de presentación. 
Estas dos líneas de argumentación estratégicas y originales no están sin embargo 
exentas de problemas. Esta nota crítica presenta los aspectos problemáticos del 
marco teórico propuesto por McCarroll. Mientras que algunos problemas afectan 
la coherencia interna de su teoría, otros se refieren a aspectos y nociones centrales 
que habrían necesitado más elaboración para ofrecer un análisis exhaustivo de la 
naturaleza de los recuerdos de observador.
Palabras clave: Memoria episódica; Memoria de observador; Perspectivas visuales; 
Imagen mental; Teorías de la memoria; Presencia del yo.
Although there were some books on philosophy of memory 
written in the past century, both the previous and the coming decades 
will be remembered for a revival of the production of books that helped 
to deepen the philosophical analysis on this often neglected topic.  Chris 
McCarroll’s Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019) will certainly 
be one of those works remembered. His aim is in certain way modest: 
unlike those who have a Kantian spirit, he does not intend to give a 
complete account neither of memory nor of one of its classical sub-kinds, 
episodic memory.  He exclusively focuses on the study of one very specific 
memory phenomenon: “observer memories”, that is, visual memories 
where one sees oneself in the remembered scene from an external 
perspective, from-the-outside. But it is precisely the specificity of his 
scope that allows him to present an in-depth and detailed analysis that 
would not be possible otherwise, by deploying a vast range of insights 
from philosophical reasoning, scientific references, and examples coming 
from visual arts and literature.
In this short piece, I will focus on two main lines of criticism to 
McCaroll’s ideas because this is the purpose of a critical notice, without 
implying that the quality of this marvelous work is dubious1. On the 
1 I make this point explicit (though it may sound evident to many readers) 
because some philosophers seem to think that if a work is susceptible of criticism, it 
is not a good philosophical work; thus forgetting that sensitivity to criticism is in the 
nature of any good philosophical creation. If we can neither find weak or problematic 
points in a philosophical writing nor think of any possible counter-argument or 
alternative line of thought, the writing then is a piece of art or a dogma, but not a 
real philosophical work.
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contrary, it is clearly exceptional, and will be of interest not only to 
memory researchers but also to those engaged in the study of visual 
imagery and the perspectival mind.
The aim of McCarroll’s work is to understand the nature of 
observer memories by moving beyond the traditional and common sense 
conception that memories of this kind are less accurate, faithful, and 
genuine than their counterpart: visual field memories, that is, memories 
in which the remembered scene is seen as one originally experienced it, 
from one’s original point of view.  As McCarroll explains, field memories 
seem more authentic because they preserve, in principle, the original 
visual perspective, whereas observer memories do not.  Using Bernecker’s 
(2010) distinction between memory truth and memory authenticity, 
we could believe that despite observer memories being true —in the 
sense that they depict an event that actually happened—, they are not 
authentic because they differ from the past visual representation that 
was not from-the-outside.  The observer memory representation would 
not only present the event remembered from a perspective that was not 
part of the original experience, but would also present an additional 
content: a representation of oneself experiencing the event.  That is why 
observer memories would be less accurate, faithful, and thus genuine 
than field memories. 
In order to deal with this line of reasoning and dethrone the 
traditional and common sense conception of observer memories, 
McCarroll makes two major moves in his work. The first one consists 
in showing that observer and field perspectives are not really mutually 
exclusive, and can be both present during an experience, while encoding 
it and also remembering it. Multiple sources of information, modalities 
and perspectives are in fact available during an experience, and 
this multiplicity is reflected in the construction of memories of that 
experience. The defense of the richness of our experiences and memories 
takes up most of the chapters of his book (chapters 2, 3 and 5). In his 
second move, which is mostly developed in chapter 6 (but also to some 
extent in chapter 4), McCarroll argues that in observer memories there 
is no additional explicit representation of oneself experiencing the event: 
self-presence is transparent, identification-free and given by the mode 
of presentation. The content—in the sense of the intentional object—
would be the same in field and observer memories, so the former would 
not be more genuine than the latter.
The first line of argument is quite convincing but not 
unproblematic, as I show next.  Against the traditional and common 
sense conception of observer memories, it is possible to argue that 
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memory retrieval is reconstructive, which means that multiple causes 
produce memory content at the time of recall and hence memory 
representations generally differ from past perceptual representations. 
Within this framework, both observer and field memories would have 
a reconstructive nature. Arguments in favor of reconstruction are not 
really needed because in the last couple of decades, science has provided 
massive evidence in favor of this thesis at all levels of explanation (see 
for example Schacter & Addis, 2007). But McCarroll warns readers 
about the efficacy of this strategy2: it could still be argued that observer 
memories are more reconstructive than field memories because along 
with the reconstructive content, they present an anomalous perspective. 
That is why McCarroll adopts a different tactic and develops the 
Constructive Encoding approach, which is, in my opinion, one of the most 
original parts of his work. According to this proposal, the content that is 
available during the encoding of an experience is rich: it is not limited to 
sensory data, but includes multimodal information (such as kinesthetic 
and affective information) and —most importantly for McCarroll’s 
purposes— multiperspectival information. During an experience, 
information does not necessarily have to be egocentric: all modalities 
can present information from an allocentric point of view, that is, from 
a frame of reference different from oneself or one’s body.  This is also 
the case for spatial and visual imagery. The three main examples that 
McCarroll introduces to give credit to this claim are very convincing: 
(a) the allocentric cognitive maps that are available during perception 
and allow us to navigate the spatial environment (O’Keefe & Nadel, 
1978); (b) amodal perception, that is, the capacity we humans have of 
perceiving the whole object through mental imagery, although only parts 
of the object available from a particular visual perspective affect the 
sensory receptors; (c) and cross-modal informational translation, such 
as the possibility of generating (observer) visual imagery in the absence 
of visual perception through information coming from other modalities, 
like kinesthesia. Therefore, because visual allocentric information is 
in general present during our experiences and the process of encoding 
them, observer memories are not more reconstructed and less authentic 
than field memories. 
The Constructive Encoding approach is quite a compelling and 
original thesis that is backed up with scientific data. It is not itself 
2 “Defending remembering from-the-outside in terms of the generation of content 
may not be completely satisfactory. An observer perspective skeptic may simply 
conclude that reconstruction at retrieval involves a degree of invention” (McCarroll, 
2019, p. 58).
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problematic, but raises questions about the need of such a thesis and 
its consequences for the general framework that McCarroll intends to 
defend. In fact, the original argument that criticizes the authenticity of 
observer memories only makes sense under certain conceptualization of 
memory.  If genuine memories need to preserve all or some significant 
part of the content of the original representation, observer memories 
are clearly less genuine than their field counterparts. The preservation 
of content is a necessary condition in classical and neo-classical causal 
theories of memory (Martin & Deutscher, 1956; Bernecker, 2010; for a 
categorization of theories of memory, see Michaelian & Robins, 2018). 
But the preservation of content is not a requirement in all memory 
accounts. In a functionalist framework that defines a memory state 
according to the role it plays in our cognitive architecture, observer and 
fields memories could be both equally genuine3. This is also the case in 
Michaelian’s (2016) simulationist account of memory, which considers 
memories as simulations of past episodes not different in nature from 
future projections and other kinds of imaginative simulations. According 
to Michaelian’s proposal, observer memories are not less genuine than 
observer memories: both are the result of a simulation operated by 
the episodic construction system, which “makes its best guess” as to 
what the scene must have looked like from one perspective or the other 
(Michaelian, 2016, p. 137).  Even a (causal) theory of memory that adopts 
a distributed conception of memory traces (Sutton, 1998) considers that 
field memories are not more fundamental and intrinsically tied to reality 
than observer memories: both are the product of a construction and 
both can be accurate and genuine (Sutton, 2010).  As Sutton explains, 
the thought that “construction entails distortion only makes sense 
against a background assumption that genuine personal memory must 
replay or archive the past in an exact copy of an original experience” 
(Sutton, 2010, p. 33). Consequently, although the Constructive Encoding 
approach can be considered as a truthful account of our experience and 
our encoding processes, its introduction to prove that observer memories 
are authentic memories is only needed in a preservationist framework. 
3 This is not the case in Fernandez’ functionalist account of memory (2019), which 
explicitly casts doubts on the genuineness and accuracy of observer memories. But 
even within this framework, it would be possible to give a full memory status to 
observer memories if observer memories were considered as memories presented 
from an unoccupied point of view—such as McCarroll does—and not from the point 
of view of some other person, and identification-free. The denial of genuineness and 
accuracy is not really a consequence of Fernandez’ functionalist framework, but a 
consequence of his narrow conceptualization of the nature of observer memories.
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Functionalist and radical constructivist theories of memory do not need 
this approach to accept the authenticity of observer memories. In fact, not 
the approach itself, but the idea that observer perspectives are genuine 
because they maintain the external perspective that one adapted at the 
time of the event4 is plainly incompatible with the theories mentioned 
above. In conclusion, the real enemy that McCarroll challenges with 
the Constructive Encoding approach is traditional preservationism; 
that is why the conception of memory that he implicitly assumes in 
order to give a full memory status to observer memories is also a kind 
of preservationism. It could be called “quasi-preservationism” because 
McCarroll allows memory to incorporate new content that was not 
included in the original experience, whereas a strict preservationism 
considers that a memory representation does not include content not 
included in the original representation. Nonetheless, in his account, 
preservation of some content coming from the original experience is 
essential but generation and construction of content at retrieval are not. 
Hence the label “quasi-preservationism”. This categorization certainly 
goes against McCarroll’s explicit endorsement of a constructive and 
active nature of memory, yet it inevitably follows from the prominent 
place given to the Constructive Encoding approach in his defense of the 
authenticity of observer memories. 
Therefore, a quasi-preservationist conceptualization of memory 
is a consequence of the Constructive Encoding approach. But there 
is another undesirable consequence for the main picture of memory 
that McCarroll’s wants to depict. Because of the important role played 
by the Constructive Encoding approach to save the genuineness of 
observer memories, the notion of accuracy and faithfulness of memory 
representations becomes inevitably associated with the preservation 
of content. McCarroll could have done a different move to avoid this 
4 “(…) experiencing external perspectives at the time of the original event is a 
genuine possibility. On this view, the experiential content at the time of the original 
event is maintained in remembering from-the-outside. Allocentric information 
available at the time of encoding can be what one attends to, and this allocentric 
information is artfully coordinated into a detached observer perspective, which then 
results in a memory recalled from-the-outside” (McCarroll, 2018, p. 93). McCarroll 
makes similar statements in other parts of chapter 2: “I propose that information from 
a number of sources and multiple modalities will be available during an experience, 
and that this information may be selected, interpreted, manipulated, translated, and 
encoded in a memory —a memory in which one may see oneself from-the-outside” (p. 
87); “What the Constructive Encoding approach proposes is that these varied sources 
of information may be available during the original experience, and are attended to in 
ways that may encourage the encoding of memories from-the-outside” (p. 94).
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supposition. For example, he could have tried to dissociate construction 
and post-event generation of content from distortion and falsehood 
by arguing that field memories are also the product of constructive 
processes which may include post-event information or by showing that 
in many cases new content is needed in order to construct a faithful 
and accurate memory of the past. Although the latter strategy seems 
more evident in memories with a narrative form (see Campbell, 2006; 
Habermas, 2012), it can probably be extrapolated to visual memories 
with little difficulty. While remembering traumatic experiences such as 
physical violence or murder, a field memory that is focused on a salient 
feature of the traumatic event—such as the weapon—to the detriment 
of other important details, contains less information and thus is less 
faithful to the past event than an observer memory that presents a 
visualization of the entire scene from a bird’s eye view. 
Furthermore, the Constructive Encoding approach and the idea 
that we may encode memories from-the-outside is in tension with the 
hypothesis of chapter 5, which proposes the existence of a plurality 
of perspectives at retrieval. This plurality is understood in different 
ways. First, McCarroll argues that there is no necessary correlation 
between different perspectival modalities. Visual, kinesthetic and 
emotional imageries are dissociated, so an observer visual memory 
can be coupled with an internal emotional perspective, and vice versa. 
Second, a memory of a single event may present multiple perspectives 
of the same modality: in the case of visual imagery, the same memory 
may shift between field perspective and different observer perspectives. 
Third, perspectival boundaries may even be blurred, and a memory may 
be recalled from both a field perspective and an observer perspective 
simultaneously. 
Whereas this thesis, which may be called “Plurality of 
Perspectives at Retrieval”, presents a very interesting and novel 
approach to understand memory construction, it also raises some 
questions. First, the idea of internal and external emotional imagery 
is itself problematic, especially as it is treated in chapter 5. Kinds of 
emotional perspectives do not seem to be similar to kinds of visual 
perspectives. Whereas observer or external visual memories refer to 
memories presented from an unoccupied point of view rather than 
from the point of view of some other person (thesis defended by 
McCarroll in chapter 4), external emotional memories are never from 
an unoccupied point of view and rarely from the point of view of some 
other person.  Most of the time, the “from-the-outside” of an observer 
emotional memory must be interpreted as from-the-outside of the 
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past self who experienced the event, but is still internal to the subject 
who remembers, and thus from-the-inside. It can refer to the way I 
appraise now a past event, or to the way I appraised the past event 
in some time x after the event. So the terms “internal” and “external” 
do not mean the same when applied to emotional perspectives or to 
visual perspectives, and the common and indiscriminate use of these 
terms to talk about perspectives of different nature seems misleading. 
What is more, the emphasis on the plurality of perspectives in distinct 
modalities hides the fact that there are some interactions between 
these different perspectives and that their combination is not merely 
accidental. McCarroll mentions Valenti, Libby & Eibach’s work (2011) 
on observer perspective imagery and its relation to regret for actions 
and inactions, but he does not present a survey and analysis of the rich 
empirical literature on the interaction between visual and emotional 
perspectives, which is specially relevant to understand and treat 
clinical conditions such as traumatic and intrusive memories (Holmes 
& Matthew, 2010).  A reader interested in empirical research may feel 
that a section like the one proposed is missing in a chapter focused on 
the plurality of perspectival modalities.
Secondly, the thesis about the plurality of perspectives at retrieval 
is in tension with the Constructive Encoding approach, which states that 
memories may be encoded from-the-outside, and also with an idea that 
McCarroll develops in chapter 6: that the perspective is given to a sort of 
“perspectively neutral” memory content by the mode of presenting that 
content at retrieval. So there are three different theses that seem mutually 
incompatible between them: (a) the observer perspective of memories 
is determined at encoding; (b) the observer perspective of memories is 
determined at retrieval; (c) visual perspectives are multiple and even 
simultaneous in a memory so there is no pure observer memory or pure 
field memory. Unfortunately, McCarroll does not explain how these 
different theses may become compatible or not, but suggests in the last 
page of the concluding chapter (p. 198) that there are different kinds of 
observer memories, those that are the product of a switch of perspective 
operated at retrieval, and those that originated in observer perspective 
experiences.5 If the authenticity of observer memories is grounded in 
5 When explaining these examples, McCarroll uses the notion of “reconstruction” 
and “construction” in a way that I personally find puzzling: whereas memories that 
switch its perspective are the result of reconstructive processes, memories that 
conserve the perspective of the original experience are produced by constructive 
processes. The use of the concepts of “reconstruction” and “construction” should 
be switched. “Reconstruction” refers to a process of creating something again that 
131
ANÁLISIS FILOSÓFICO 40 Nº 1 (mayo 2020)
OBSERVER MEMORIES AND THE PERSPECTIVAL MIND
the fact that observer perspectives are available during the encoding 
of the experience, as the Constructive Encoding approach suggests, 
it is natural to wonder if memories that are “converted” to observer 
memories at retrieval are more reconstructed and so less authentic than 
those originated in observer perspective experiences. The Constructive 
Encoding approach does not account for the authenticity of “converted” 
observer memories, so McCarroll should have said something more 
about it. If McCarroll’s original idea was to propose the existence of 
different kinds of observer memories, it is a pity that he did not develop 
it in detail, maybe in a specific chapter devoted to different kinds of 
observer memories.
On the other hand, the thesis (c) poses other kinds of problems. 
As McCarroll explains, the variations in point of view during a single 
memory experience are well documented in empirical literature. In 
fact, they account for the dynamic and ever-changing stream of our 
consciousness. But the simultaneity of perspectives in a single “frozen 
snapshot” of a visual memory is a much stronger thesis and the different 
examples mentioned by McCarroll to support it (Cubism, dual viewpoint 
in gesture, multiperspectival imagery in comics) are not very convincing. 
On one hand, if multiperspectival visual memories are a kind of visual 
memories among others, this new type would add more complexity to 
the already complex picture suggested by McCarroll, and would have 
certainly deserved more explanation. Are all multiperspectival memories 
originated in multiperspectival experiences? Or do some of them come 
from pure field experiences and others from pure observer experiences? 
Does the original perspective of the experience count as a criterion to 
identify visual memory kinds along with its current perspective? How 
many kinds of visual memories are there? These are all legitimate 
questions for which an attentive reader might expect some answers 
somewhere in the text. On the other hand, if visual memories are in fact 
multiperspectival, the distinction between field and observer memories 
loses its sense, and McCarroll’s project of explaining the nature of 
has been destroyed or fragmented (or distributed in multiple memory traces). 
“Construction”, on the other hand, refers to an entire new process of creation that 
does not necessarily try to reproduce or copy something that existed before. Tulving 
(1983), for example, uses the terms in this way : “remembering is not an activation of 
something that exists in the form of a latent disposition (…) Rather, it is a constructive 
activity that uses components from episodic memory (the engram) as well as semantic 
memory (the cue) (…) Ecphory is a re-constructive activity only in the sense that the 
rememberer feels the ecphorized event to belong to the past (…) ; from the point of 
view of theory there is nothing re-constructive about it” (Tulving, 1983, p. 180).
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observer memories becomes difficult to understand. Nevertheless, 
there seems to be a little confusion over the idea of multiperspectival 
visual memories. Information used to construct visual memories can 
be multiperspectival, such as in a Cubist painting, where the physical 
appearance of a person or an object is depicted from distorted multiple 
perspectives. But this does not mean that the visual memory itself needs 
to be multiperspectival. Although field and observer memories can be 
both constructed from multiperspectival information, they still seem 
to differ in one essential feature: the presence or not of the self who 
remembers. If the self-presence is the distinctive trait that determines 
the perspective of a visual representation, the perspective of a visual 
memory representation can be either field or observer, but not both. 
This leads us to the other major theme that McCarroll develops 
in chapter 6 to prove the authenticity of observer memories: the 
presence of the self in remembering from-the-outside. The traditional 
and common sense conception of observer memories considers that they 
are not really genuine because they do not show immunity to error 
through misidentification (IEM). The reason: they are explicit de se 
thoughts, that is, thoughts about oneself in which the self is explicitly 
represented, as part of the explicit content of the thought. So they 
involve an identification component that is potentially misleading: 
one may misidentify oneself when one remembers someone doing an 
action. Someone other than oneself could have done it. So although 
the event remembered can be accurately depicted, the identification of 
the person who participated or performed the event might not be. This 
kind of thought contrasts with de se implicit thoughts, in which the 
representation of the self is not part of the explicit content but appears 
implicitly, through the mode of presenting that content. The first-
personal aspect of such implicit de se thoughts (such as those presenting 
proprioceptive information) guarantees that one cannot be mistaken 
about the identity of the bearers of such states. I cannot misidentify 
myself when, for example, I feel pain or am hungry.  Similarly, it seems 
that one cannot misidentify oneself when one remembers an action 
from the same perspective as it appeared to oneself in the past, when 
it was performed. So for the traditional conceptualization of memory, 
field memories are genuine memories because they are IEM, whereas 
observer memories are not because of their lack of immunity.
In consequence, McCarroll’s second main strategy in favor of 
observer memories is to try to prove that “if episodic memory is IEM, 
then remembering from-the-outside, as an instance of episodic memory, 
will manifest IEM” (McCarroll, 2019, p. 159). Once again, his enemy 
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is preservationism. Only a radical preservationist such as Recanati 
(2007) can consider that the IEM is a condition of the genuineness of 
memories. A constructivist would probably find no link between IEM and 
genuineness. And if (s)he finds it, it would probably not be grounded on 
the presence or not of an explicit representation of the self in the visual 
memory image of an event, especially if (s)he approaches the subject from 
a naturalistic perspective. For example, the ownership of memories is 
in fact sometimes disputed (particularly between twins) and the visual 
perspective does not play any role in proving who is right: disputed 
memories are just likely to be recalled from a field perspective as non-
disputed memories (Sheen, Kemp & Rubin, 2001; 2006).  That is why the 
argumentation developed in chapter 6 reads as a response to Recanati, 
given from an expanded version of Recanati’s general framework and 
in a certain way only valid within its limits. What is more, it confirms 
once more McCarroll’s adoption of quasi-preservationism instead of the 
constructivist approach that he professes at the beginning of the book. 
“Conceiving of observer perspectives as implicit de se has explanatory 
value” (McCarroll, 2019, p. 180) only in a preservationist framework. 
Other conceptualizations of memories allow us to understand observer 
perspectives as genuine episodic memories without conceiving them as 
implicit de se thoughts, that is, without denying that the representation 
of the self can be part of the memory content.      
In any case, for the purpose of proving that observer memories 
are not different from field memories in what concerns IEM, McCarroll 
makes two moves.  The first one consists in arguing that observer 
memories are identification-free, and the second one, that the presence 
of the self is not an added content to the visual representation of the 
past event but is given by the mode of presentation of that content and 
so, like field memories, observer memories are implicit de se thoughts.
Concerning the first point, McCarroll presents some examples in 
order to show that in observer memories one sees oneself without having 
to explicitly identify oneself. According to his explanation, this is possible 
because self-presence is not the object of one’s awareness: there is no 
ghostly self whose experience of seeing is part of the memory content. The 
self is thus more implicitly than explicitly represented, so it is transparent 
and does not involve a process of identification: in an observer memory, 
one’s identity is given immediately and non-inferentially. This contrasts 
with photographs of oneself whose identification, following Rowlands 
(2017), can certainly be immediate, but only in a contingent way and not 
as a necessary feature of one’s encounter with the photograph. McCarroll 
does not delve into this interesting topic, but the difference between a 
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contingent and a necessary immediate identification for photographs 
and visual memories respectively is not so obvious. Whereas probably 
most of our memories are identification-free, some of them—maybe only 
a few—may require an explicit identification process: I have a clear 
image of myself driving along the Sydney to Melbourne Coastal Drive, 
but my partner insists that it was him who mostly drove all along. This 
makes me doubt about the identity of the driver and, without still being 
convinced that he was the one who drove all along, this doubt makes the 
image of me driving blurry, and so the human silhouette of the driver 
is not anymore identified with me in an immediate and non-inferential 
fashion.  Was it me who drove? Or my partner? This kind of doubt about 
the identification of myself in a visual memory image is not so different 
from the kind of doubt that may arise when my image in a photograph 
is not very distinct and I have reasons to believe that the silhouette may 
correspond to other person than me. Similarly to visual memories, this 
identification component in photographs is more an exception than the 
rule, so it is expected that most of the identifications of our photographic 
self-images are immediate and non-inferential. If this is the case, it is 
not evident per se why in visual memories this immediate identification 
would be a necessary feature whereas in photographs it would only be 
a contingent one. The way we identify ourselves in visual memories 
may finally not be so different from the way we identify ourselves in 
photographs.
Coming back to McCarroll’s argumentation, the next move is to 
argue that the self-presence of observer perspectives implicitly arises 
from the mode of presentation. For this purpose, McCarroll proposes 
to replace the dualistic mode/content distinction characteristic of 
Recanati’s framework by a tripartite structure inspired by the School of 
Brentano, which distinguishes between act, object, and content or mode 
of presentation (also used by Rowlands, 2017). The idea is that the same 
object with the same type act (remembering) can fall under different 
modes of presentation, among which, field and observer perspectives. 
The mode of presentation affects how one remembers the object, so 
the complete content of our memories changes according to the mode 
of presenting the object, but the object that one remembers remains 
the same. That is why, explains McCarroll, “in remembering from an 
observer perspective one is simply remembering the event, rather than 
remembering having seen oneself during the event” (McCarroll, 2019, p. 
176).  This kind of “expanded” framework to understand mental states 
allows McCarroll to rule out the traditional idea that observer memories 
present a content that is added to the original one: the representation 
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of the self.  Nonetheless, it is not very clear in the argumentation how 
the localization of the self in the mode of presentation helps to avoid 
an identification component in observer memories and thus to prove 
that they are IEM. The previous argument presented in support of 
the identification-free nature of observer memories is in principle 
valid even in a framework where the self is given in the content. In 
fact, McCarroll’s proposal that the interoceptive information and other 
forms of internal embodied subjective imagery that are used in the 
construction of observer memories are responsible for “the subjective, 
first-personal, and from-the-inside essence of remembering from-the-
outside” (McCarroll, 2019, p. 172), suggests that the presence of the self 
in observer memories is given by the nature itself of the information and 
not by the mode of presenting it, as he pretends. If “the self-presence of 
observer perspective memory is internally constructed” (Ibid.) and “may 
result from this multimodal integration of information” (Idem, p. 66), 
how can it be produced by the mode of presentation? 
What is more, in McCarroll’s framework, the idea that visual 
perspectives are given by the mode of presentation raises questions 
about the conceptualization and usefulness of the notion of “mode of 
presentation”. Both field and observer memories are cases of episodic 
memories, that is, memories of events personally experienced. As such, 
the intentional object of both memories is presented “as one that has 
been formerly witnessed, orchestrated or otherwise encountered” by 
the rememberer (Rowlands, 2017, p. 49). So the intentional object of 
field and observer memories is already subsumed under a specific 
mode of presentation: the episodic one. McCarroll does not mention 
the episodic mode of presentation but indirectly assumes it in his 
framework: only the mode of presentation can distinguish an episodic 
from a semantic memory. But then the relationship between these 
more fundamental modes of presentation and the perspectival ones 
becomes confusing, as well as the explanatory role played by the notion 
of “mode of presentation”. To give an example: the representation—
full of nostalgia— of me strolling along the beach with my ex-partner 
would be a memory whose intentional object is subsumed under the 
episodic mode of presentation (which allows me to remember that 
image as something I formerly experienced), but also under the 
visual observer perspective mode of presentation (which allows me to 
see myself in the image), and under the affective observer mode of 
presentation as well (which allows me to feel a new emotion towards 
that past event). This multiplication of modes of presentation to 
account for different traits of a memory is somehow tangled, as well as 
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the multiplication of presences of the self that it implies: the presence 
of the past self who previously experienced the event, the presence of 
the past self who is “seen” in the visual memory, the presence of the 
current self who is feeling nostalgia. That is why the resignification 
given to the notion of “mode of presentation” to simultaneously refer 
to different kinds of mental states and standpoints of our mental life 
does not present the same robustness as the original Fregean concept 
applied to propositional attitude ascriptions.6 In conclusion, within the 
conceptual framework proposed by McCarroll to understand mental 
states, the explanatory power of the concept of “mode of presentation” 
becomes suspicious in a certain way, and more should have been said 
to clear up these doubts.
In any case, one thing is clear: the hard, thoughtful and original 
work done by McCarroll in this wonderful book. Although some readers 
may regret the quasi-preservationist framework implicitly assumed to 
explain the nature of observer memories, it is undeniable that McCarroll 
not only achieves his main goal by debunking the idea that observer 
memories are less genuine than field ones, but also presents a masterly 
explanation of visual observer perspectives and the perspectival mind.
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